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Recent concern within Congress and the Department of
Defense over the growing Backlog of Maintenance and Repair
(BMAR) of military real property, has encouraged the search,
within the armed services, for a more effective approach to
reducing the BMAR level. Within the Navy, the problem was
seen as a resource allocation problem, rather than a technical
deficiency in maintenance procedures. The solution, there-
fore, has centered around the line officer, who controls the
programming of funds rather than the facilities engineer.
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A. DESCRIPTION OF PROBLEM
1. General
Since 1962, there has been increasing concern both
within the Department of Defense (DOD) and the other government
agencies over the general deterioration of government-owned
real property. The prime indicator used to monitor the effec-
tiveness of Maintenance of Real Property (MRP) efforts is the
Backlog of Maintenance and Repair (BMAR) , which is all of those
items which have been identified as requiring MRP funding dur-
ing a particular fiscal year but which remained on the mainten-
ance list at the end of that fiscal year.
Over a period of years the official definition of BMAR
has been repeatedly altered in an attempt to make the term more
meaningful. The current operating definition of BMAR is:
The end of fiscal year measurement of repair
work remaining as a firm requirement of the
installation work plans but which lack of re-
sources prohibit accomplishment in the fiscal
year.-*-
The problem noted by both Congressional and DOD observ-
ers was that the level and trend of the BMAR were unsatisfac-
tory. Because Congress believed that a contributing factor to
this problem was that funds which had been authorized for MRP
were diverted to other operations within the military services,
it enacted a statutory floor or bottom line spending level on
10

funds for MRP in the 1963 DOD Appropriations Act and sub-
2
sequent appropriation acts.
Despite increases in the maintenance floor over the
past fifteen years, the BMAR has not only gone undiminished,
but it has continued to grow. During the eight year period
from 1965 to 1972, for example, the BMAR within DOD increased
3from $286 million to $677 n\illion. During these years the
4Navy BMAR increased from $136 million to $345 million. With
this adverse trend, and with Congressional attention focused
on the backlog, the BMAR figure became suspect as a true indi-
cator of the effectiveness of MRP efforts. "Over the years,
managers and reviewers within DOD have discussed the credibil-
ity and validity of the backlog." Doubts regarding the valid-
ity of claiming an MRP problem on the basis of an increasing
BMAR were fueled by the observation that despite the military's
apparent inability to maintain its current real property hold-
ings as shown by the increasing BMAR, the services continued
g
to request funds for the construction of additional facilities.
By inference, the military's physical plant was not being
maintained in "satisfactory" condition.
The military services cited inflation as the primary
cause of the BMAR growth. Yet, when the BMAR was converted
7
to constant dollars, it still showed a growth pattern. Fur-
ther, it was established that the BMAR figure was conservative,
representing a much smaller backlog than what actually existed.
11

other reasons given for the growth of the BMAR were:
a. increased emphasis on identifying the backlog,
b. insufficient funding,
c. continued deterioration of previously identified
deficiencies, and
d. redefinition of the term BMAR, so that it encom-
passes a broader scope.
2. Funding for MRP
Within the Navy, funding for MRP is budgeted under the
heading of Real Property Maintenance Activities (RPMA) . RPMA
includes four functional categories:
a. Maintenance and Repair — including recurring
maintenance of a routine nature and major repair
projects
b. Minor Construction — construction projects under
$100,000
c. Operation of Utilities — including procurement or
production and distribution of utilities
d. Other Engineering Support — including public
works engineering and administration, custodial
services, refuse collection and similar support
services.
The first two items together constitute MRP. The
Navy's BMAR consists of maintenance and repair projects that
were not accomplished during a fiscal year due to a lack of
funding in the Maintenance and Repair portion of MRP.
12

3. The Navy's Response to the BMAR
The Director, Shore Activities Planning and Program-
ming Division of the Chief of Naval Operations (OP-44) is the
office which is responsible for providing guidance in the area
of real property maintenance in the Navy's programming and
planning process. Starting from the 1974-1975 time frame,
this office was involved in the restructuring the Navy's ap-
proach to meeting the MRP problem. The solution, as seen by
OP-44, centered around the line decision maker, not the staff
engineer.
The situation causing the BMAR growth and the deter-
ioration of the Navy's physical plant was viewed by OP-44 as
a resource allocation and timing problem. The dollars required
to reduce the level of the backlog were being allocated to
other purposes, notably acquisition of new property. The new
approach utilized to deal with the situation was to try to
convince the line decision makers controlling the allocation
process that it would be in the best interests of the Navy
if a greater share of the available resources was directed
toward maintaining existing structures. What led the Navy,
guided by OP-44, to this conclusion as well as an assessment
of the resulting program's prospects for success, form the
substance of this thesis.
B . OBJECTIVE
The objective of this thesis is to examine the new OP-44
program with regard to the original perceptions of the problem
13

and the subsequently developed objectives for MRP management
in the Navy. It will also explore the long term potential for
the success of the program in light of the dominance of the
line manager in the decision and allocation process. In addi-
tion, the thesis will also study the new MRP program's impact
to date on the area of base support.
C . METHODOLOGY
Research for this study was accomplished primarily by means
of a literature search and personal interviews. Documents,
such as Navy instructions, reports, and Congressional testimony
on the Navy's MRP were obtained from OP-44. Additional back-
ground material was obtained from military journals and other
periodicals, and from a bibliography prepared by the Defense
Logistics Studies Information Exchange.
The primary source of background information consisted of
a taped discussion and telephone conversations with Rear Admiral
Robert F. Jortberg, Civil Engineer Corps, U.S. Navy (retired).
Prior to his retirement, RADM Jortberg occupied the position of
OP-44. He was instrumental in the Navy's decision to utilize
its present approach to controlling BMAR. In order to gain
insight into the perception of the problem and possible solu-
tions from the viewpoint of professionals in the field, the
author conducted interviews at a number of individual naval
activities
.
This information was then reviewed against the stated
objectives of the MRP program and the perceptions of the field
14

professionals in order to assess the program's prospects for
success or failure and to derive lessons learned.
D. THESIS ORGANIZATION
Chapter II will present a description of the programming
process through which the Navy acquires and maintains its real
property. It will discuss the historical circumstances which
led to the Navy's concern over the condition of its real
property. The mechanics of the Navy's approach to this prob-
lem will also be reviewed.
In Chapter III, the MRP program's objectives and the ra-
tionale guiding the Navy's present course of action in regard
to BMAR will be presented along with noted strengths and weak-
nesses of the program to date. There will be an assessment of
how well the approach is functioning at this time and the im-
pact it is having on the area of base support.
Finally, Chapter IV will summarize the major points pre-
sented in the thesis and the apparent direction of future MRP




The author is indebted to RADM Jortberg who provided a
significant amount of background information as well as en-
couragement and patience in the writing of this thesis. The
author also wishes to express gratitude to Commander P. Drennon,
Civil Engineer Corps, U.S. Navy, of the current OP-44 staff,
who provided instructions and other Navy documents used in the
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research for this thesis. However, the text is solely the





In Chapter II, the factors underlying the Navy's approach
to the Backlog of Maintenance and Repair (BMAR) problem will be
examined. This will begin with a brief overview of the extent
and composition of Navy property. A historical discussion fol-
lows which traces the flow of traditional Navy thought in the
area of facilities management. Next, the structure through
which the Navy acquires and maintains property will be des-
cribed. The final section of the chapter will be a report of
the key elements of the OP-44 program to alleviate the BMAR
problem.
B. EXTENT OF PROPERTY
It is surprising to realize how extensive in scope and
diverse in character are the facilities that the Navy uses
and maintains. The Navy's physical plant (including land)
as of September 1979 had an acquisition cost of approximately
$14.5 billion and a conservatively estimated replacement cost
9
of $69.7 billion. At that time, the Navy was responsible for
3,779,7 89 acres of land which is an area larger than the
State of Connecticut.
The Naval Facilities Engineering Command (NAVFACENGCOM)
,
as the Navy's facilities specialist, maintains individual
property record cards which describe each structure or facil-
17

ity that the Navy owns. NAVFACENGCOM publishes a number of
consolidations and summaries of the information contained in
the property record cards (collectively referred to as the
"Navy Facilities Assets Data Base") , one of which is the
"Inventory of Military Real Property, Navy" (NAVFAC V-ll) .
This large, annually updated document features a breakdown of
Navy property by various factors such as geographical area
and major claimant.
The Navy's physical plant included some 170,517 separate
land items which are classified into 110 different groupings,
called category codes. Appendix A gives a listing of the
category codes and descriptions that the Navy uses in the
management of its real property. These category codes include
items that would normally be associated with a Navy such as
its waterfront facilities (piers, seawalls, and small craft
berths, to name a few) airfields, sev/age plants, computer
centers, research and development facilities, training facili-
ties, and ammunition depots, as well as less expected ones
such as museums and memorials, and railroads. The sheet vol-
ume and variety of the Navy's physical plant is part of the
problem in maintaining such a system of facilities. For
example, the Navy owns, and consequently it must maintain, a
12
total of 1,148 miles of railroad track which is enough to




1. Prior to 1974
In the early 1950s the then Bureau of Yards and Docks
(BUDOCKS) , NAVFACENGCOM ' s predecessor, initiated a program to
apply many principles of industrial engineering to Navy main-
tenance problems. The program was designed to bring about
more productive use of available resources. These efforts
first began with respect to the maintenance of automotive
equipment. The program was successful and the principles
were applied in the area of Maintenance of Real Property (MRP)
.




Prior to the initiation of CMP, there was no Navy-wide,
comprehensive set of procedures to govern the activities of
individual shore activity Commanding Officers (CO) , and Public
Works Officers (PWO) . The CMP recognized that significant
improvements in productivity could be achieved if standard
maintenance procedures based on sound industrial principles
were applied on a Navy-wide basis.
The CMP involved three main elements. The first ele-
14
ment of the CMP was a continuous inspection program. The
results of this program are summarized in a report called the
Annual Inspection Summary (AIS) , which is produced annually.
The purpose of the continuous inspection program is to
provide a systematic routine procedure for identifying exist-
ing deficiencies rather than depend on these being noticed on
19

a haphazard basis. An important feature of the continuous
inspection program was the determination, using engineering
principles, of appropriate frequencies for inspections so
that those facilities which were subject to fairly rapid de-
terioration would be inspected more frequently than those
which were less sensitive to the elements and less subject to
rapid wear. This helped to ensure that the best use was made
of the limited number of skilled inspectors available.
The second feature of the program involved the estima-
tion of the cost and workload involved to correct deficiencies
identified through the continuous inspection program. Defi-
ciencies identified by the inspections, when written up in the
form of job orders, constituted a work backlog for each of the
Public Works shops at individual activities. The overall pro-
gram involved a shops scheduling function to assure that each
of the shops could be properly loaded.
The third element of this program was a comparison of
the actual costs in man hours and materials to the original
estimates. This injected discipline into the program and pro-
vided an opportunity to evaluate the productivity of the
force.
The focus of virtually everything that was done under
the CPM was on productivity at the shop level in order to ob-
tain the greatest possible value for the money spent. It is
important in defending budgets to have supportive programs
which the Navy can point to in order to show that it is
20

attempting to get the best possible return on its investment.
The CMP was such a program. While the focus was appropriate,
this was not the sole problem in facilities maintenance. There
was another significant area which was essentially ignored from
the middle 1950s until the middle 1970s.
The basic problem came to be seen by the OP-44 analysts
not as whether the resources were being used productively, but
rather, whether there was enough money available to maintain
the total plant that the Navy owned. The problem was one of
resource allocation rather than activity level engineering or
production efforts. Within OP-44, it was felt that it was not
a problem v/hich could be ultimately corrected by the activity
PWOs or by NAVFACENGCOM. The solution would require the con-
certed effort of the line management command structure of the
Navy, through Major Claimants and activity COs in line manage-
17
ment. Given the size of the physical plant that the Navy
owned, it should take a certain minimum amount of money to
operate and maintain the plant. Without at least that mini-
mum level of maintenance funding, facilities would deteriorate,
and sooner or later, this would adversely impact on mission
readiness. By the mid-seventies it was becoming obvious that
this was in fact happening.
2. Deterioration of the Physical Plant
With Congressional attention focused on statistics
showing a rising BMAR, the poor condition of real property




During 1975 more money was spent to repair for-
eign object damage to jet engines at Naval Air
Station Miramar than was needed to overlay the




It was noted that there was enough money available to repair
19the engines, but not enough to fund the overlay. A further
example is the following:
In July 1974 Pacific Fleet ships could not be
refueled at Point Molate in San Francisco Bay
as the fuel pier was so badly deteriorated that
it was unsafe to bring ships alongside. Refuel-
ing was accomplished by barge. The design to
repair the pier had been finished with a price
tag of $3.5 million. ... The (fiscal year)
76 budget of the Navy Material Command then
being submitted included a total of $2.6
million for all major repair projects ...
for the entire command . 20
3. From 1974
In 1974 there was general recognition among the Navy's
senior leaders that the condition of too many Navy facilities
was poor; almost all categories of facilities were affected
including runways, parking aprons, waterfront activities at
naval stations and shipyards, support facilities, and ware-
21housing. In real dollar terms, from 1966 to 1974, there had
been a reduction in maintenance dollars. Figure 1 shows BMAR
as a percentage of the current plant value (CPV) during the
period 1966-1983. Figure 2 shows the extent of the backlog
compared with constant fiscal year 1980 dollars.
Contributing to the difficulty of the situation was




AS A PERCENTAGE OF CURRENT PLANT VALUE
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GRAPHIC CONSTANT FISCAL YEAR 1980 DOLLARS
COMPARISON OF EXPENDITURES AND BACKLOG OF MAINTENANCE





to suffer from decreased funding. These were the years when
the country was engaged in the Vietnam conflict. Funds for
many programs were being preempted to the war effort. While
it was true that the Navy enjoyed an increased budget during
these years / the additional funds were used to purchase am-
22
munition, petroleum products, and other wartime materials.
In the case of MRP, the question was raised that, "If
the Navy had been a leader in the application of industrial
engineering techniques, how could it allow such a dramatic
reduction in the maintenance effort to occur?" The answer was
that while the Navy was careful to develop the most productive
methods of using its maintenance resources, it failed to al-
locate enough of those resources to MRP in the first place.
Adequate funds were not budgeted, regardless of well justified
25
arguments protesting the need for more maintenance dollars.
4 . The Navy's Tradition of Bureaus
While the Vietnam conflict drained resources, the MRP
effort was affected by another problem, one involving the Navy's
organizational traditions. The Navy's Civil Engineer Corps
officers were regarded as the Navy's facilities managers. The
perception of the bulk of the line officers was that MRP was
solely an engineer's responsibility; that BUDOCKS (and later
NAVFACENGCOM) would take care of things in time; and that this
2 6
was an area in which a line manager need not be concerned.
Some of the roots of this attitude go back to the 19 62-196 3
time frame when BUDOCKS was given single executive responsibil-
25

ity for maintenance management in order to correct problems
caused by the Navy's having gone too long a period without a
strong maintenance program.
NAVFACENGCOM single executive responsibility for MRP
prevailed for two or three years until terminated when the
entire Department of Defense was placed under the Resource
Management System (RMS) by the Office of the Secretary of De-
fense (OSD) comptroller. Dr. Robert N. Anthony. The RMS sys-
tem was based on the premise that resources should flow along
lines of responsibility, that is, along command lines. The
concept of single executive responsibility was inconsistent
with RMS.
Single executive responsibility was slowly phased out
of the Navy but its influence lingered. Senior officers still
harbored the idea that direct control of the MRP, and by infer-
ence, responsibility for the deterioration of the physical
plant, belonged entirely to the civil engineers and NAVFACENG-
COM. The tradition of bureaus (BUDOCKS, the Bureau of Medicine,
and the like) , with its concentration of single area expertise
was, and still is, particularly strong in the Navy. The line
manager did not worry about the BMAR problem because it was
considered a BUDOCKS problem; unfortunately, BUDOCKS did not
have the means to singlehandedly correct it.
To understand how such a situation could have developed
and the structure v^ithin which a solution to the problem would
26

have to be developed requires an explanation of the Navy's
process for obtaining and allocating resources.
D. THE PRESENT PROGRAMMING PROCESS
1. Consolidated Guidance
The programming process is the fundamental resource
allocation process in the Navy. The product of this process,
the budget is an interpretation of basic or fundamental policy
decisions into operating plans which are then expressed in
terms of resources. Figure 3 illustrates the basic structure
of the planning, programming and budgeting process. Each year
the Secretary of Defense (SECDEF) translates the thinking of
the President and the National Security Council into a compre-
27hensive document called the Consolidated Guidance . This in-
corporates strategic thinking, basic policies and judgements,
and basic financial and fiscal guidance into a single document.
The Consolidated Guidance is then promulgated by SEC-
DEF to the service secretaries. It provides them with long-
range direction about the roles and missions of the services,
the force structure that is likely to exist, and the ways in
which the services are to support one another. The bottom line
is that the Consolidated Guidance says how much manpower the
armed services can have and how many dollars will be available




The decision making process in the Navy is formally
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Memorandum (POM) . The POM, which is submitted by the Navy to
SECDEF each spring, summarizes how the Navy plans to respond
tO/ or accommodate the guidance given; that is, how it plans
to use the resources that were identified in the Consolidated
Guidance as being available. There is then a period of time
in which the Navy is given the opportunity to make choices as
to how the resources will be allocated over the following five
year period. The Navy can decide how much of the total money
available it wishes to allocate to various functional areas,
such as the procurement of new aircraft, the maintenance of
existing aircraft, research and development, and military pay.
Within the Operations and Maintenance—Navy (O&MN) appropria-
tions, the Navy can make a choice as to how many dollars will
be allocated to the MRP. Once this programming decision is
made, it is incorporated into budget documentation. The
congressional floor on MRP spending is then fixed as a per-
centage, currently 90 percent, of this budget figure.
It is important to note that within the Navy the total
amount of funding which is being allocated is a 'fixed, finite
amount of money. The available dollars have to be allocated
to all of the activities in the Navy in some rational way in
order to obtain the best compromise among all requirements.
If the Navy decides that it wants to put more money into MRP,
it must take that money away from somewhere else. Navy man-
agers have to consider from which programs dollars can be
diverted to address needed requirements in other programs.
29

In practice/ this whole process is biased by its very
nature in favor of the procurement of new things: ships, air-
29
craft, weapons, and facilities. It is biased m favor of
new procurement because it is relatively easy to identify the
benefits which will result from a new acquisition and the risks
associated without proceeding with the new acquisition. It
seems to be more difficult to specifically and clearly identify
the effects associated with changes in funding for almost any
O&MN programs, of which MRP is only one. This is particularly
true for MRP because there is no sharply defined boundary
separating a particular facility's "satisfactory" condition
from an "unsatisfactory" one. The judgment is ultimately
subjective and the criteria for making it often inherently
imprecise and variable.
It was in this atmosphere that OP-4 4 approached the
problem of insufficient MRP funding.
E. THE OP-44 PROGRAM
1. General
The program developed by OP-44 is structured around
the task of breaking the total BMAR figure down into functional
area figures, each of which can be individually dealt with by
Major Claimants. The Major Claimants provide command assess-
ments of the potential for adverse impact of MRP deficiencies
on the Navy readiness in each applicable functional area.
Integral to the program is the concept of a fixed cost of
ownership of real property.
30

2. Cost of Ownership
The key device used by OP-44 to translate the poor
condition of Navy facilities into a realization that additional
MRP funding was required was the concept of the cost of owner-
ship. Cost of ownership is:
. . . the minimum funding necessary to offset
routine maintenance requirements of active
facilities. Funding below this level results
in consumption of plant assets and accumulation
of nondeferable rriaintenance backlog. -^^
Basically the argument used was that when the Navy
decides to acquire some property, it is also making an implicit
decision to commit funds for maintaining it. This means that
the Navy is investing not only the capital required to buy or
construct the property, but is also making a commitment to
spend future resources to at least maintain it at some mini-
31
mum acceptable level.
Productivity isn't enough. Line people in-
volved in resource allocation must recognize
an obligation to commit sufficient resources
to maintain their assets. Expressing it in
terms of cost of ownership, line decision
makers must realize that when they decide to
acquire and own real property, they must
commit adequate resources to maintain this
property at or above that minimum. -^^
A useful example would be the purchase of a home or
automobile, both major investments for the average family.
The purchase price and financing are not the sum total of
costs which are expended on these items. Owners expect to
incur additional maintenance costs during the normal life of
31

these assets. This theme was then applied to the Navy's real
property.
... a relater' and extremely powerful concept
that helps support the decisions for funds in
MRP and also helps explain the enormous inertia
that must be overcome before BMAR can be re-
duced is the concept of the 'fixed cost of
ownership. ' Simply, if you own something you
need, then you have a responsibility to properly
maintain it. ... the fixed cost of ownership,
or necessary funding level, must contain not
only the minimum funds, but enough additional
funds to effect a reduction in BMAR over a
planned objective period of say 10 years. -^-^
The line of reasoning utilized by OP-44 was that it is
not prudent to build new facilities if the Navy cannot afford
to maintain the ones it already owns. As an example, it was in-
congruous that funds for new hospitals were being programmed at
a time when there were major MRP problems in existing hospitals,
34including recently built ones.
3. The Process
In breaking the total BMAR figure down into more manage-
able functional area groupings, OP-44 made use of an existing
structure for investment categories (IC) , which are groupings
of similar facilities with related contributions to Navy
35
missions. The eighteen ICs are listed below:
IC NO . DESCRIPTION
01 Aviation Operational Facilities
02 Communications Operational Facilities
03 Waterfront Operational Facilities




06 Aviation Maintenance and Production Facilities
07 Shipyard Maintenance and Production Facilities
08 Other Maintenance and Production Facilities
09 Research, Development, Test and Evaluation
Facilities
10 Petroleum, Oil and Lubricants Supply and Storage
Facilities
11 Ammunition Supply and Storage Facilities
12 Other Supply and Storage Facilities
13 Medical Facilities
14 Administrative Facilities
15 Troop Housing and Messing Facilities
16 Other Personnel Support Facilities
17 Utilities
36
18 Real Estate and Grounc Structures
The mechanics of the OP-44 program involve the follow-
ing
a. a continuous inspection program at each shore
activity in the Navy. In addition to reliance on the existing
inspection programs at the individual activities, steps were
taken to strengthen them. It was noted that
We are funding a complete inspection effort
by (Public Works Centers) PWC ' s , who have
developed an ADP assisted management system
to help them do a thorough job. At the same
time, our initiatives in developing special-
ized inspection techniques will be realized




b. a determination and validation through the line
chain of coimnand of the nondeferable portion of the total de-
ficiencies identified by the inspection;
c. a narrative assessment of the condition of the
facilities;
d. a review by a board consisting of an OP-44 repre-
sentative and representatives of the Navy's major claimants;
e. the development of program objectives for a five
38year strategy to reduce the Navy's BMAR.
Figure 4 illustrates the basic steps of this process.
4 , Nondeferable Maintenance and Repair Backlog (NMAR)
Initially the OP-44 program to reduce the Navy's BMAR
involved the reporting of the Nondeferable Maintenance and
Repair Backlog (NMAR) as of 30 March each year, plus a projec-
tion of the NMAR to the end of the fiscal year. By definition,
NMAR backlog for a given fiscal year is the
estimated dollars value of maintenance and
repair deficiencies of a nondeferable nature
. . . for which corrective action is not for-
mally authorized at the end of the fiscal year
(September 30) .^9
Nondeferability is bound by several parameters, chief
among them is loss of mission. Other criteria include cost
avoidance with regard to inflationary cost growth; life or
death safety; quality of life (refering to habitability of
unaccompanied personnel housing and work areas) ; and threat
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In developing the present solution to the BMAR prob-
lem, OP-44 sought to develop a totally credible backlog figure
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to present to Navy line managers and to Congress. The search
for a manageable BMAR figure led OP-44 to identify that portion
of work which could not be deferred beyond the current program
year without serious consequences, generally stated in terms
of mission degradation.
Failure to fund the minimum cost of ownership
over a prolonged period of time has caused the
nondeferable maintenance and repair backlog to
reach such a magnitude that it is affecting
the Navy's ability to perform its mission. ^^
As it turned out, the process of estimating the NMAR
and projecting it to the end of the fiscal year was later de-
termined to be unwieldy. As a result, the program as currently
implemented does not use this procedure. NMAR is now reported
as of 30 September, eliminating the requirement for six-month
projections, and thus improving accuracy. The NMAR inputs are
received and totaled from each Major Claimant. To the degree
that these are no changes due to validation at the OPNAV level,
then the total NMAR equals the BMAR, which is reported to OSD
and to Congress.
5. Funds Migration
Towards the end of each fiscal year, funds appropriated
for that year but which will not be utilized as originally plan-
ned, become available to the Navy as year-end residual funds.
These funds can usually be reprogrammed to meet requirements in
other areas. MRP is an ideal area to absorb such funds since
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fairly large amounts can be quickly obligated.
The Navy is careful to include in its MRP funding
requests an estimate of these funds which are expected to
migrate from other program areas and be used for MRP . The
table below illustrates how funds migration, indicated here as
a program adjustment, is used in calculating the end-of-year
backlog figure.
CONG/PRES BUDGET SUBMISSION O&M, NAVY
BACKLOG OF MAINTENANCE AND REPAIR (BMAR) OF REAL PROPERTY'*^
($000)
1979 1980 1981
A. BACKLOG - BEGINNING OF YEAR 536,000 563,000 587,000
B. REQUIREMENTS ;
(Recurring Maintenance & Repair) 261,671 282,483 290,436
(Major Repair Projects) 154,263 191,796 234,329
(Backlog Deterioration) 16,080 16,890 17,610
C. TOTAL REQUIREMENTS (A + B) 968,014 1,054,169 1,129,375
D. PROGRAM ADJUSTMENTS ;
(Direct Program Funding) 375,241 442,169 572,375
(Funds Migration from Other
Program Areas) 29,773 25,000 25,000
E. BACKLOG - END OF YEAR (C - D) 563,000 587,000 532,000
F. PERCENT BMAR CHANGE ( (E - A) - A) +5.0% +4.1% - 10.3%
F . SUMMARY
In this chapter, the background of the Navy's BMAR program
has been discussed with special attention focused on historical
factors and the programming process. The principles of the
Navy's present program, as these have developed, were outlined.
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Chapter III will explore the rationale governing the Navy's
decision to adopt that particular program and an assessment
made of potential long range effectiveness in regard to meet-
ing the BMAR program's objectives.
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III. DISCUSSION AND ANALYSIS
A. INTRODUCTION
In Chapter I the Backlog of Maintenance and Repair (BMAR)
problem was defined. The purpose and methodology of this
thesis were outlined. Chapter II presented an overall des-
cription of Navy real property and a discussion of the histor-
ical events contributing to the development of the Navy's BMAR.
The proposed solution to the BMAR problem, as implemented by
OP-44, was then outlined. Now, in Chapter III, the rationale
underlying the OP-44 solution and the major elements of the
solution will be examined in detail. Special attention will
be paid to Navy organizational constraints and the effect they
had in shaping the particular solution to the BMAR developed
by OP-44. The strengths and weaknesses of the OP-44 program
will be itemized and the factors affecting the long term pros-
pects for success of the program will be reviewed.
B. THE REASONS BEHIND THE NAVY'S APPROACH
1. BMAR as a Measure of the Problem
a. Significance of the BMAR Statistic
The only tool or indicator which was available to
the decision makers in looking at the area of Maintenance of
Real Property (MRP) was the figure for the total BMAR. The
BMAR was generally defined in dollars; that is, the estimated
funding required to correct deficiencies. Alternatively, the
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BMAR was sometimes cited as a percentage of the current plant
value (CPV) of real property. However, clear understanding of
the limits of each of the aforementioned statistics was missing.
From time to time, some number, such as 10%, was
cited as the appropriate percentage of CPV that the BMAR should
properly be. However, there was no objective basis on which
44to justify any such figure. With regard to the BMAR stated
as a funding requirement, it had been noted (most importantly,
by Congress) that the level of BMAR continued to rise, despite
increasing maintenance appropriations. To state that there
was a backlog, which is all that the BMAR figure actually did,
was in and of itself meaningless. A legitimate question both
among Navy decision makers and within Congress would have
been, "To what purpose was continued increases in maintenance
dollars when they apparently, as measured by the BMAR figure,
had no effect?" What was needed was a basis on which to decide
whether a particular level of BMAR was either acceptable or
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was too high. This could not be determined from the BMAR
figure itself. Navy, Department of Defense (DOD) , and Con-
gressional decision makers needed to know what level of back-
log could actually be tolerated by the Navy at any given time.
The answer to that question was demanded by senior
decision makers for the simple reason that they operated in a
world of limited resources, where less than perfect solutions
to problems had to be made to work. The Navy, they knew,
would always have a backlog. The critical decision they had
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to make was to decide what portion of the limited resources
they had at their disposal should be allocated to the BMAR
problem at the expense of other pressing needs. Since the
total BMAR statistic could not give the answer to that ques-
tion, it was of no significance to them. Not unexpectedly,
they were inclined to give the whole BMAR question short
consideration and concentrate instead on attacking problems
which could be understood and at least partially alleviated,
b. Large Extent of Total BMAR
The shore facilities of the Navy are so diverse,
geographically and functionally, that to address them as a
single entity and to speak in terms of the total backlog was
not effective. Such an approach masked the differing impacts
that various elements of the backlog had on the Navy's mission
readiness. The BMAR so stated was not relevant to the Navy's
decision makers because it was not presented in terms which
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were meaningful to them as operationally oriented leaders.
This was particularly true in light of the fact that an in-
crease in MRP funding would probably have necessitated a de-
crease in funding in some other area of Navy operations. The
program that OP-44 developed was an attempt to provide an
understanding of the significance of the BMAR and a method of
relating that significance to the operational concerns of the




While a single assessment of condition for
the whole naval shore establishment would
be so broad as to be meaningless, a break-
down into facilities with related contribu-
tion to missions can be prepared ...'^^
2. OP-44 Program Concepts
a. General Approach
After examining the situation, OP-44 concluded
that the "BMAR problem" was not caused by either an actual
shortage of potential funding for MRP purposes or by defi-
ciencies in the technical abilities of activity level Public
Works personnel. First, Congress had never shown any unwilling-
ness to fund MRP actions so long as they remained convinced
that there was a legitimate problem. The objection was more
that whatever the true funding requirement for maintaining
real property was, it did not necessarily increase automat-
ically simply because the BMAR increased.
Secondly, the Controlled Maintenance Program (CMP)
was, by all indications, doing what it was intended to do,
namely, ensure that the activity level personnel actually
responsible for accomplishing maintenance work were as tech-
nically proficient and productive as possible.
Accordingly, OP-44 set about developing a program
with a different emphasis, one which would attack the BMAR
problem by attaining two new goals:
(1) preserve adequate MRP funding levels by re-
storing credibility to the Navy's data which supported requests
to Congress for MRP funds; and
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(2) ensure that an adequate portion of the resources
made available by SECDEF were allocated by senior decision
makers to the maintenance of real property.
The key to obtaining these goals and thus solving
the basic problem was the development of a procedure which
would permit the Navy to completely fund those MRP items which
could not be deferred without mission capability degradation.
This was pursued through the concept of the "fixed cost of
ownership."
With respect to Congress, it was OP-44's intent to
present a BMAR target figure which was totally credible, rather
than base the Navy's funding requests on a broader, but less
defensible base.
b. Investment Categories (IC)
The first step in the solution was determined to
be the breakdown of shore facilities into classifications. The
vehicle used was an already existing system called "Investment
Categories (IC)". These had been used for some time to categor-
ize the Navy's physical plant investment when programming mili-
tary construction. The same classifications, with relatively
minor changes, were applied to the area of MRP.
The breakdown of the investment category functional
areas corresponds closely with the interest of the decision
makers in OPNAV. (Figure 5) The Deputy Chief of Naval Opera-
tions for Aviation Warfare (OP-05) , for example, would be
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operational facilities. Senior decision makers in the opera-
tional chain and, particularly, the supporting staffs have
quite specialized interests and concerns. They are respon-
sible for components of the total problem. Their focus is on
those factors of the total problem which pertain to their area
of cognizance. In the Navy's organizational structure they
have neither the resources nor the charter to develop more than
a passing concern with problems outside their own areas.
By breaking the total set of naval shore facilities
down into investment categories, OP-44 bypassed the amorphous
nature of shore facilities as a whole and identified facilities
in such a way that the senior decision makers had only to
relate to facilities problems in their area of cognizance.
Having developed this approach through the use of
ICs, the question remaining was the mechanics of communicating
to the decision makers some meaningful information about the
facilities. The technique chosen was to create and to maintain
an "operational impact profile" for each IC . The purpose was
to bring together in document form for each IC all the facts
which could be generated concerning the effect that the main-
tenance backlog was having on operational readiness.
The operational impact profiles include for each
IC the following information:
(1) total inventory in that category;





(3) BMAR for each category and percentage of the
total
;
(4) trend of expenditures over time;
(5) relationship between funding and BMAR;
(6) age distribution, showing which portion of the
plant was very young or very old;
49
(7) what funding was already committed in the POM.
c. Assessment and Planning
From these facts, a judgment was developed by the
OP-4 4 staff, concerning the condition of the property in each
IC. Given the funding previously committed in the POM and the
potential for the condition of the facility in each category
to have an adverse impact on Navy readiness, the degree of
impact was assessed over the period of the POM.
This process constitutes an attempt to interpret
the BMAR, to establish its significance to the Navy and to the
functional areas of the mission, rather than to merely state a
statistic. Formerly funds had been programmed merely to MRP.
Now they were to be programmed, at least in general terms, to
MRP by IC.
Having developed the profile, the next step was to
determine what level of funding each IC needed. Each of these
determination was put into the form of a five-year program
objective. The total resources required for each of the
eighteen ICs were then summed up. This provided the total
resources required for the Navy as a whole for the five-year
46

50period. Appendix B gives a typical Sciirple of the results
of this process, the program objectives for fiscal year 1981.
The information developed during this process was
then considered by the decision makers during the development
of the POM. It was in a form that enabled them to weigh argu-
ments that it was necessary to put more money into this cat-
egory or that one. In discussing the condition of runways,
for example, one could discuss the implication of not putting
more money into their repair.
The argument was presented this way:
if you go to war, you will be increas-
ing the tem.po of your flight operations
-
you will be flying heavier aircraft with
heavier loadings. The runways and park-
ing aprons which are in bad condition
now, are going to get worse. It will be
necessary to pull them out of service at
the time when you need them the most.^-^
The telling point was made that the Navy would never allow the
flight decks of its carriers to deteriorate to the same extent
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as some of the runways ashore. This type of contingency
argument was repeated for other categories, such as waterfront
facilities, medical facilities, and others. In the Navy struc-
ture, phrasing the problem in this manner was critical to its
consideration by specialists in their own areas of cognizance.
d. Involvement of the Major Claimant
The implemented program requires that the activity
Commanding Officer (CO) prepare an assessment report to accom-
pany the already required routine preparation and submission
of the Annual Inspection Summary (AIS) . The assessment report
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is to reflect the CO's judgment of the condition of the real
property at the activity level. Claimants are then to eval-
uate these reports and make their own assessments of the con-
dition of their property by IC and submit them to OP-44 who
integrates them into a Navy-wide assessment.
The key role played by the Major Claimants is due
to the fact that they are the level closest to the operating
forces which has the breadth of view to make an assessment that
is not too parochial in outlook. Assessments prepared at lower
levels can consider specific segments of the operational readi-
ness picture in greater detail because these levels are closer
to the day-to-day efforts of the operating forces. Lower
echelons are thus likely to be aware of the existence of an
operational limitation imposed by a facilities deficiency
sooner than higher levels and to have a more detailed apprecia-
tion of exactly what the extent of the limitation is. They
are, however, restricted in the scope of their concerns and
thus unable to evaluate the relative serousness of different
deficiencies. Similarly, echelons above the Major Claimant
level are likely to have easy access to the current information
concerning overall funding situations and mission requirements
that is needed to properly assign priorities to competing
programs. However, their distance from the actual operating
elements makes it difficult for them to remain current con-





Major Claimants are situated at a level that best
avoids either extreme. They are close enough to the operating
forces to have a good appreciation of the actual problems faced
by those forces at any given moment. At the same time, they
are also close enough to the senior decision making levels to
be able to place specific facility deficiencies in proper
perspective. Conscientious, careful efforts by Major Claimants
are thus particularly critical to the proper functioning of the
OP- 4 4 program.
Note that the procedures implemented under the OP-44
program involve much more than simply a flow of technical in-
formation from the Public Works Officer (PWO) to the Major
Claimant's staff facilities specialists. This was intended to
be a flow of command judgment, however influenced it might be
by the PWO. This change from the previous procedure, whereby
the AIS proceeded from the activity directly to the Naval
Facilities Engineering Command (NAVFACENGCOM) with only a
courtesy copy to the Major Claimant, is integral to the Navy's
current approach to the BMAR problem.
C. OPINIONS FROM THE FIELD
1. General
Although the OP-44 program requires very little change
in the mechanics of "business as usual" at the activity level,
the ultimate test of the program's success will be measured in
terms of its positive or negative effect on the individual
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activity's real property holdings. In order to obtain a per-
ception of how the program is being received to this point,
interviews were conducted with field personnel. Those inter-
viewed were members of either Public Works Departments or
Staff Civil Engineer offices at six California naval activi-
ties, representing four Major Claimants: a Public Works Center,
a Supply Center, two air stations, a shipyard, and a weapons
station.
Appendix C presents a list of the questions to the
interviewees at each activity. No statistical inferences were
drawn from these information gathering interviews. Although
this thesis does not draw statistical inferences on the BMAR
figures at each location, questions 1 and 2 served to orient
the author to the particular circumstances at each command.
Not all of the questions were answered at all of the activities.
There tended to be a difference in orientation between
Navy Industrial Fund (NIF) activities and those funded pri-
marily through O&MN. Repair projects at NIF activities are
funded from the general overhead. They have to compete for
funding only with other projects at the particular NIF activity.
The effects of OP-44's program would thus tend to have less of
an impact at NIF activities than at activities that do not have
the option of funding repairs out of earnings generated by the
repaired facilities.
Generally speaking, there was little consensus among
the personnel interviewed as to the effect that the OP-44
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program was expected to have in the long term at their activi-
ties. Some pointed to recent increases in the MRP budget but
they did not share similar views concerning the long term
continuation of this funding. A summary of the major points
of discussion follows.
2 . Inspections
Every individual interviewed emphasized the importance
of the initial inspection procedure. Some mentioned the de-
cision by OP-4 4 to provide mission management funds for inspec-
tions directly rather than have NAVFACENGCOM fund the inspec-
tions. This was discussed in a favorable light. While those
interviewed acknowledged that budget increases for inspection
purposes were helpful the advantage gained by increases were
seen to be offset by either constant or decreasing civilian
manpower ceiling points. Without inspectors, the adequacy
of the inspection procedures would be in jeopardy.
Offsetting this was one interviewee's opinion that
there are never enough inspectors, even in the best of times.
The individual relates it to the general problem of insufficient
resources with regard to any problem. However, the introduc-
tion of procedures into the inspection cycle utilizing special-
ized equipment such as infrared scanners and supporting com-
puter programs may lessen the impact of fewer inspectors.
Personnel attached to activities serviced by a PWC
expressed concern that inspectors from PWC were not sufficiently
familiar with the buildings under their cognizance thereby
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affecting PWC's ability to provide an accurate AIS . It is
noted that customer activities must still validate reports
submitted by the PWC.
The concern for the validity of the PWC inspections
touches another area other than purely technical. Although PWC
conducts the AIS and estimates the cost of the repair project,
the funding for the project comes from the customer activity's
Major Claimant. Some interviewees felt that this division of
responsibility reduces the incentive for PWC to keep the costs
down. One individual recommended that total ownership and
management responsibility be transferred to facilities engi-
neers to eliminate this problem. This would essentially
constitute a return to the single executive responsibility
concept.
3. Workload
Some personnel felt that the new OP-44 program would
cause an initial increase in workload, but would eventually
result in long term savings, both in time and dollars. Others
felt that there would be no net increase in workload. The
Maintenance Control Divisions of Public Works Departments are
the level which would be most directly affected at the local
activity by the changes imposed by the new program. Interest-
ingly, there was an unexpectedly positive response to the pro-
gram from the Maintenance Control supervisors interviewed.
This included one interviewee who definitely felt that there
would be an increase in work in his division. This enthusiastic
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response was made by the civilian working managers at a level
close to actual operations.
Because of pressure during recent years to reduce the
number of civilian ceiling points, an increasing percentage of
total workload is being performed through contractors. The
increase in contracts in itself was seen to cause additional
work for facilities managers in overseeing the quality of work.
Relating the problem to this issue, increased MRP funding
meant more contracts to manage.
4. Funding
In general NIF activities tend to be in better financial
shape than O&MN funded activities because MRP of production
facilities can be charged to the customer in the form of higher
overhead rates. What has tended to nullify this advantage in
the past has been the pressure to keep the rates down.
Interviewees mentioned special funding packages re-
ceived during the last fiscal year which constituted a sub-
stantial increase in the level of their BMAR funding. The
BMAR funding addition received for the current fiscal year
was less than for last year. Still, the total level of MRP
funding was greater than it had been in the past. Many felt
that this was due to presently increased visibility of the
BMAR problem and that, while grateful for the windfall, they





Many of the comments of the interviewees were found to
be remarkably polar with regard to their attitudes and percep-
tions of the OP-44 program. This fact was considered in the
development of the following section which discusses the
program's effectiveness.
D. ASSESSMENT OF PROGRAM'S EFFECTIVENESS
1. General
The growing BMAR problem was determined by OP-44 to be
caused by an insufficient provision of adequate maintenance
funding at the beginning of the programming cycle. The solu-
tion developed was designed to improve the condition of the
Navy's physical plant by programming in more maintenance
dollars during this fundamental programming process of the
POM. In doing so, it impacts on several levels of decision
making: the activity, the Major Claimant, OPNAV, DOD and
Congress. The program is also intended to provide a more
objective and systematic way of assigning priorities to
maintenance requirements.
2. Program Impact at Each Level
a. Activity
At the activity level, the program focuses increas-
ed attention on the part of the CO to the problem of maintain-
ing the facilities at some acceptable level. Little has been
added to the mechanics of the continuous inspection program
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except the assessment by the CO of the condition of the real
property at that facility.
b. Major Claimant
The major emphasis, however, and the level that
the program is targeted at, is the Major Claimant. This is
the point about which maintenance funding pivots. It is the
Major Claimant input which provides the basis for the POM.
It is the Major Claimant who must be convinced of the neces-
sity of adequate maintenance funding in order to maintain
the state of readiness that the mission requires. Without
that belief or convinction, as the past has shown. Major
Claimants have no incentive to even consider facilities main-
tenance a serious matter for their concern. The cost of
ownership concept tied a familiar idea to the broad perspec-
tive of real property acquisition and upkeep. In doing this,
and in providing an objectively supported justification for
increased maintenance attention, the program was intended to
lend greater credibility to the whole claim for an adequate
level of maintenance spending.
The Major Claimant is the pivot point around which
this program is structured. It is the Claimant's assessment
of the condition of real property which ultimately provides
the basis for the POM. In order for the program to be effec-
tive, it is necessary to convince the Major Claimant of the
seriousness of the maintenance backlog and the Claimant's role
in correcting the situation. The reference to the cost of
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ownership concept can go far in putting the elements of the
problem in perspective,
C . OPNAV/CNO/DOD
The OP-44 program provides to the very highest
level of decision making of CNO's staff and DOD, a framework
within which senior leaders can organize and evaluate avail-
able information and apply it to the problem of MRP. Without
this structure, it was difficult to focus attention to even
critical problem areas,
d. Congress
Presumably the OP-44 program would have a similar
impact at the Congressional level as well, and for much the
same reasons. The General Accounting Office (GAO) in its
August 31, 1979 report to Congress was, in effect, a vote of
'no confidence' aimed primarily at the military's requests not
only for increased maintenance funding, but also for acquisition
dollars. GAO challenged the need for new acquisitions in the
light of the services ' apparent inability to maintain the prop-
erty already on inventory. The direction of the Navy's solu-
tion indicates that OP-44 concurred with the Comptroller General
that the basic problem was primarily one internal to the mili-
tary services; that it did not make much sense to continue to
request new purchases when even recently constructed facilities
had severe maintenance discrepancies.
The program can have the effect of improving the
credibility with the Congress over the amount of maintenance
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funding requested. On the one hand, the new system can be
used to claim the attention of the Major Claimants and the
senior management within the Navy in order to convince them
to allocate a greater share of the Navy's appropriations to
maintenance. On the other hand, the program can also be
used with comparable effectiveness outside the Navy to support
claims to Congress that larger appropriations are needed. At
this point the program is geared to answer the same question
from both senior Navy managers and the Congress: of what sig-
nificance is the BMAR? The program answers in terms of the
effect on mission readiness. In doing so, it emphasizes those
items which are more critical and which can be deferred to a
later funding period.
e. Not Addressed in the OP-44 Program
The solution proposed by OP-44 is geared toward
the programming process, a specific aspect of the maintenance
problem. It is that element of the problem which was identi-
fied by OP-44 as having the major impact from the OP-44 per-
spective. What this specific program does not claim to do is
concentrate either on improved technical aspects of maintenance
control or on construction criteria for the purpose of building
in maintenance-free characteristics into the design.
3 . Strengths and Weaknesses
a. Organizational Factors
The mechanical element of the program developed by
OP-44 to address the maintenance funding shortfall is an
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expansion of the existing continuous inspection procedure.
Already existing information was collected and presented as
investment category profiles. The direction of the AIS
reports was changed with the emphasis being concentrated on
the managers who control the funds , rather than on the engi-
neers. However, with all of the changes in orientation it is
important to note that the mechanics of the maintenance identi-
fication and reporting procedure stay fundamentally the same.
There is no additional action required at the activity level
other than the CO's assessment statement. This is considered
to be an inherently positive aspect of the solution. While a
major educational effort was launched to reorient the thinking
of both line manager and engineer, the program is devoid of
any basic changes in the collection or presentation of data.
Therefore, the program was able to make use of a familiar set
of operating procedures without disrupting the routine flow
of practices at the activity level,
b. Reliability
There remains the question of accuracy of the data
collected. While inspection techniques are being updated and
improved, this was not the primary focus of the OP-4 4 program.
All of the personnel interviewed at the individual activities
saw the inspection process as the remaining weak link in the
plan to reduce the BMAR. However, if minimum standards are
met, the goals of the program can be achieved.
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with such a large BMAR still in sight, a great
amount of fine-tuning of the identification process is not
really needed. Assuming a basic competence in the activity
Public Works or engineering staff, the OP-44 program is not
dependent on any more rigid a set of technical standards than
that which already exists. If a more exacting accuracy were
required, the program might be in danger of collapsing under
its own weight. The effort required would be too much work
without a substantial training process. It is expected, how-
ever, that as the BflAR shrinks to a more acceptable level, that
increasingly accurate identification procedures will be more
in demand. At that point, retaining a claim on scarce funds
can be expected to become more difficult, and greater accuracy
might be required to justify continued earmarking of mainten-
ance dollars.
While interest in the BMAR has been high in recent
POMs, it can be expected to take a back seat in future program-
ming proceedings, particularly as the BMAR approaches accept-
able goals. As interest wanes, there is a danger of slipping
back into habitual thought patterns. There is the risk that
the condition of the Navy's real property can again enter a
deterioration process eliminating the gains made in the last
few years
.
There is another potential problem, centered at the
activity level, which could negate the purpose of the CO's ap-
praisal to the major claimant of the condition of real property
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at that activity. There is a particularly strong unwilling-
ness on the part of Navy managers to draw attention to short-
falls in their organizations. Recent publicity has been
successful in explaining the purpose of the assessment pro-
cedure. However, there remains the danger, particularly as
the BMAR subsides, that future CO's will resort to a tradi-
tional attitude of making do with insufficient resources in
order to avoid highlighting deficiencies at their activities.
This is a temptation which senior managers must resist if the
condition of real property is to be maintained at a suitable
level. One thing that will help counter this inclination is
rigorous scrutiny at the Major Claimant and OP-44 level of the




IV. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
A. INTRODUCTION
Chapter I introduced the problem of the Backlog of Mainten-
ance and Repair (BMAR) and described the course of this thesis.
Chapter I presented an overview of the Navy's response to BMAR
and the history behind its development. Chapter III reviewed
the salient features of the Navy's Maintenance of Real Property
(MRP) program with regard to its prospects for future success.
This final chapter will reiterate the major points brought out





BMAR has undergone a number of redefinitions since 1962
in an attempt to make its meaning more significant to the
decision makers, both within Congress and the military services.
The current operating definition is that BMAR is
:
The end of fiscal year measurement and repair
work remaining as a firm requirement of the
installation work plans but which lack of re-
sources prohibit accomplishment in the fiscal
year. 53
Numerous reasons have been offered by the services for the
dramatic increase in the BMAR in the recent past, among them
inflation, continued deterioration of facilities requiring
maintenance, better inspection procedures, and increased atten-




Despite Congresional willingness to increase MRP funding
and pressure to hold the BMAR to a zero-growth level, the BMAR
has continued to grow. In light of the services' willingness
to request funding for new construction when serious mainten-
ance problems were still apparent, the BMAR became suspect as
an accurate indicator of a genuine need for maintenance funding.
In the past, responsibility for the upkeep of Navy real
property has either implicitly or explicitly been considered
the purview of the Navy's Civil Engineer community, represented
organizationally first by the Bureau of Yards and Docks (BU-
DOCKS) and later by Naval Facilities Engineering Command (NAV-
FACENGCOM) . A favorable productivity rate had failed to
correct the backlog problem. In fact, the over-reliance on
productivity may have tended to mask the true problem. The
reliance by line managers on the engineer to solve the property
MRP problem ignored the essential fact that engineers were not
in control of the funding process.
While much attention was put into budget preparation each
year in an attempt to support MRP funding, these efforts were
largely futile. Concentration on the budget overlooked the
earlier programming process, during which the major funds
allocation decisions were made. OP-44 sought to correct this
by approaching the problem of insufficient MRP funding during
the initial allocation process.
Additionally, OP-4 4 developed an approach to the BMAR
problem which shifted emphasis of property maintenance from
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the engineer to the line manager. In doing this, OP-44 in-
tended to bring to the decision maker and to Congress a means
of relating the BMAR in some significant way, to the Navy's
mission. The primary vehicle for conveying this was the con-
cept of fixed cost of ownership.
The cost of ownership principle established that the de-
cision to acquire property implied a future cost of maintain-
ing that property. To avoid doing so could be to allow the
property to deteriorate more quickly than its normal physical
life would indicate. Such deterioration would seriously im-
pact the Navy's mission readiness. This was then translated
to the needs of each decision maker through the use of invest-
ment categories (IC) , which are groupings of similar facili-
ties with related contributions to the Navy's mission. Pro-
files were developed for each. IC profiles were a collection
of factual data about the real property in each category.
Each profile included as well an assessment of the condition
of the property. The total package was designed to give sub-
stance to the BMAR figure and to relate the significance of
the BMAR to the mission areas of the line decision maker. The
ultimate purpose was to convince those in control of the pro-
gramming process of the need for additional MRP funding.
With regard to the procedure employed by OP-4 4 to handle
the BMAR problem, little has changed on the surface. The
annual inspection program is conducted very much as before.
What has been added is an assessment, by the Commanding
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officer or Major Claimant, of the condition of the real prop-
erty within their respective area of responsibility. The order
of submission of the Annual Inspection Summary (AIS) has been
altered to reflect a new emphasis on the line manager in this
process. Major Claimants are now the primary addressees of
the AIS/ with subsequent reporting responsibilities. By includ-
ing the Major Claimant in the process, at an earlier point in
time, OP-44 has brought the BMAR problem closer to the funding
source, and increased the likelihood that it will receive
adequate attention from the decision makers in the program-
ming process.
One of the major strengths of the Navy's current program
to reduce the BMAR is the incorporation of an already widely
used and understood inspection and reporting system. The use
of familiar procedures lessened the disruptive impact of change
on the organization. This is particularly critical at the work-
ing level where the importance of strategic policy is not al-
ways appreciated.
The critical level of decision making in this new process
is the Major Claimant funding. Since funds are controlled at
this level, compliance at subordinate levels can be effected
through the budget. On the other hand, the major claimants





Real property is currently enjoying the benefit of in-
creased attention from the highest levels of Navy management.
However, the question which remains is how consistent will
funding be in future years, at a time when the MRP is a less
competitive program.
The OP-44 program has added significance and credibility
to a BMAR number which, in the past, has been treated as little
more than a curious statistic. The program has accomplished
this by focusing its emphasis on the line manager, particularly
at the Major Claimant level. It further defines the nature
of the problem in meaningful terms which that line manager
can readily understand, specifically mission readiness. How-
ever, it is noted that as the BMAR figure approaches a more
acceptable level, interest in the problem is likely to fade.
This could potentially introduce a return of apathy into the
maintenance outlook. Can the Navy's program accommodate
that aspect of the problem?
The OP-44 program has already established a firm foothold
within the Navy by making extensive use of familiar organiza-
tional apparatus. By doing this, it has bypassed the problem
of bureaucratic inertia which threatens many potentially sig-
nificant programs both within government agencies and in the
private sector. If it continues to become a routine facet of
reporting and programming within the Navy, the chances of





At present, all indication from people interviewed at
various levels points toward success of the program and a
long-term beneficial effect on the condition of Navy real
property. However, analysis of the Navy's MRP program was
limited to very recent changes and their immediate effect on
the organization. The more valuable test of the program's
strength and success can only be seen in the future. It is
therefore recommended that a similar study be conducted in a
few years to determine its extended effect on Navy real
property.
2. Further Analysis
To a large extent, the potential benefits of the OP-
44 program depend on the ability to convey to senior decision
makers within the Navy a sense of urgency regarding the import-
ance of maintenance. It is further recommended, therefore,
that in order to help reinforce such a sense of urgency, con-
tinuing research be conducted into ways of relating the fail-
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155 SMALL CRFT BRTH
DESCRIPTION
Airfield Pavements - Runways
Airfield Pavements - Taxiways
Airfield Pavements - Aprons






Liquid Fueling and Dispensing -
Other
Communications -Buildings
Communications - Other than
Buildings
Navigation and Traffic Aids -
Bldgs (Non-Ship Related)
Navigation and Traffic Aids -
Other than Buildings (Non-Ship
Related)
Communication and Control Lines
Airfield Pavement Lighting
Ship Navigation and Traffic Aids -
Buildings
Ship Navigation and Traffic Aids
Other
Land Operational - Buildings
(Non-Ship Related)
Land Operational - Helium Plants
and Storage
Ship and Other Operational -
Buildings
Ship and Other Operational Facili-
ties - Other than Buildings
Land Operational - Facilities
Other than Buildings
Waterfront Operational - Piers
Waterfront Operational - Wharfs
Waterfront Operational - Cargo
Handling Facilities
Waterfront Operational - Sea


























































310 R D TEST BLDGS
390 R D TEST OTHER
411 LIQ FUEL STOR







Waterfront Operational - Other
Harbor Protection Facilities
Coastal Protection Facilities
Harbor and Coastal - Moorings
Harbor and Coastal - Marine
Improvements
Harbor and Coastal - Dredging
Other Harbor and Coastal
Facilities
Training Buildings







Maintenance - Ammunition, Explo-
sives, Toxics
Maintenance - Electronics and
Communication Equipment
Maintenance - Facilities for
Miscellaneous Procured Items
and Equipment
Maintenance - Installation, Repair
and Operation
Production - Aircraft
Production - Guided Missiles
Production - Ships, Spares
Production - Tank - Automotive
Production - Weapons, Spares
Production - Ammunition, Explo-
sives, Toxics
Production - Electronics and
Communications Equipment
Production - Facilities for Misc-
ellaneous Procured Items and
Equipment
Production - DOD Maintenance,
Repair and Operation of Instal-
lations
Research and Development and Test
Buildings
Research and Development and Test
Other than Buildings
Liquid Fuel Storage - Bulk
Liquid Storage Other than Water,
Fuel and Propellants












































































Cold Storage - Depot and In-
Transit
Storage - Covered - Depot and
Installation









Administrative Facilities - Other
Family Housing - Dwellings
Family Housing - Substandard
Trailers
Family Housing - Trailer Sites
Family Housing - Detached
Facilities
Troop Housing - EM Barracks
w/Mess
Bachelor Housing - Mess Facilities
Troop Housing - Detached Facilities
Troop Housing - Bachelor Officers
Quarters
Troop Housing - Emergency
Community Facilities - Personnel
Support and Service
Community Facilities - Exchange,
Morale and Recreation Buildings -
Interior
Community Facilities - Morale and
Recreation Facilities - Exterior
Museums and Memorials
Electricity - Source
Electricity - Distribution and
Transmission Lines
Electric Power - Substations and
Switching Stations
Heat, Steam - Source
Heat, Steam - Transmission
Heat, Gas - Source
Heat, Gas - Transmission












































Chilled Water - Air Conditioning
Transmission and Distribution
Sewage and Industrial Waste -
Treatment
Sewage and Industrial Waste -
Collection
Refuse and Garbage
Potable Water - Supply, Treatment
and Storage
Potable Water - Distribution
System
Water/Fire Protection
Water - Supply - Storage Non-
potable Water
Water Distribution System -
Nonpotable
Roads
Sidewalks and Other Pavement
Railroads
Ground Drainage
Grounds Fencing, Walls and Guard
Towers





Temporary Use License or Permit







FY 82-86 Maintenance and Repair
of Real Property Program Objectives
IC 01 Aviation Operational Facilities :
0&M,N - Major emphasis on maincenance and repair of airfield pavements is
essential. The Navy must strive for full runway availability during
mobilization, maximum feasible flight safety conditions, and substantial
freedom from pavement induced foreign object damage. Actions must be
initiated which minimize the potential for structural damage to aircraft,
and hazards to personnel or equipment during operations at wartime
tempo. Resource planning and execution efforts should allow for a major
reduction in BMAR during the FYDP period in order to achieve the minimum
shop backlog of nondeferable work which is commensurate with efficient
production scheduling by FY 1986.
NIF - Airfield pavement deficiencies at RDT&E facilities are outstripping
the capacity of the individual activities to accrue NIF funds to initiate
repairs. Major emphasis should be placed in this category to prevent
mission impact on major aircraft and systems tests program.
IC 02 Communications Operational Facilities ;
OiiM,N - No special emphasis is required. Resource planning and execution
efforts should allow for BMAR containment (no growth) during the FYDP
period.
NIF - No special emphasis is reqilired.
IC 03 Waterfront Operational Facilities ;
0&M,N - Major emphasis on maintenance and repair of waterfront facilities
is essential. The obvious importance of these facilities to Naval readi-
ness mandates a continuous effort to improve their condition. Harbor
dredging and the proper maintenance of piers, pilings, fender systems and
fleet moorings must be accomplished as necessary to avoid curtailment of
mission critical operations. Resource planning and execution efforts
should allow for a major reduction in BMAR during the FYDP period in
order to achieve the minimum shop backlog of nondeferable work which is
commensurate with efficient production scheduling by FY 1986.
NIF - Serious deficiencies in this category will impact available
berthing for industrial use and ammunition loading at shipyards and
weapons stations. The problems are particularly sensitive at weapons
stations with underutilized capacity. Special emphasis should be placed
in this category to prevent deficiencies from deteriorating to a level
which will make repairs from accrual impossible.
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IC 04 Other Operational Faeilicies :
0&M,N - No special emphasis is required. Resource planning and execution
efforts should allow for BMAR containment (no growth) during the FYDP
period.
NIF - No special emphasis is required.
IC 05 Training Facilities ;
0&M,M - The maintenance and repair of training facilities should receive
special emphasis. Facility conditions must be improved in order to
ensure the presence of a proper academic atmosphere, and to avoid
adversely affecting student-instructor relationships. Resource planning
and execution efforts should allow for a modest rate of BMAR reduction
during and beyond the FYDP period in order to achieve the minimum shop
backlog of nondeferable work which is commensurate with efficient
production scheduling by FY 1988.
NIF - No special emphasis is required.
IC 06 Aviation Maintenance and Production Facilities ;
0&M,N " No special emphasis is required. Resource planning and execution
efforts should allow for BMAR containment (no growth) during the FYDP
period.
NIF - Special emphasis should be placed in this area to assure constant
availability of aircraft maintenance. NARFs, especially, should be able
to provide uninterrupted maintenance service under wartime tempo.
Current conditions would hamper this service.
IC 07 Shipyard Maintenance and Production Facilities ;
0&M,N - No special emphasis is required. Resource planning and execution
efforts should allow for BMAR containment (no growth) during the FYDP
period.
NIF - Serious deficiencies in shipyard maintenance and production
facilities exist. Special emphasis is required to prevent the backlog
from deteriorating to a level which will make plant repairs from the
accrual process prohibitively expensive for customers to support.
IC 08 Other Maintenance and Production Facilities ;
0&M,N - No special emphasis is required. Resource planning and execution




NIF - Significant backlog exists due to age of facilities and previous
deferral of maintenance. Problem is most prevalent at PWCs and some
ordnance facilities. Level of backlog has impact on Che ability of
activities to perform assigned mission. Special emphasis should be
placed to reduce backlog to a manageable level.
IC 09 RDT&E Facilities ;
0&M,N - No special emphasis is required. Resource planning and execution
efforts should allow for BMAR containment (no growth) during the FYDP
period.
WIF - No special emphasis is required.
IC 10 POL Supply and Storage Facilities ; ^
0&M,N - The maintenance and repair of POL Supply/Storage facilities
should receive special emphasis. Concentrated efforts should be directed
to improve the condition of these facilities in order to avoid inter-
ruption of ship and aircraft fueling operations, and to avoid fuel oil
spills. Increased inspection efforts are required to determine the
actual deterioration present in POL facilities. Resource planning and
execution efforts should allow for a modest rate of BMAR reduction during
and beyond the FYDP period in order to achieve the minimum shop backlog
of nondeferable work which is commensurate with efficient production
scheduling by FY 1988.
NIF - Increased inspection is retpiired to determine the true nature of
plant condition. These facilities are unique and require specialized
inspection techniques to determine true extent of problems. Hidden
deficiencies could be detrimental to any effort to increase tempo of
operations to mobilization levels.
IC 11 Ammunition Supply and Storage Facilities ;
0&M,N - No special emphasis is required. Resource planning and execution
efforts should allow for BMAR containment (no growth) during the FYDP
period.
NIF - No special emphasis is required.
IC 12 Other Supply and Storage ;
0&M,N - The maintenance and repair of other Supply/Storage facilities
should receive special emphasis. Resource planning and execution efforts
should allow for a modest rate of BMAR reduction during and beyond the
FYDP period in order to achieve the minimum shop backlog of nondeferable
work which is commensurate with efficient production scheduling by
FY 1988.
NIF - No special emphasis is required.
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IC 13 Medical Trainin;; ;
0&M,N - The maintenance and repair of medical facilities should receive
special emphasis. Additional attention should be given to routine main-
tenance in order to prevent accelerated facility deterioration. Resource
planning and execution efforts should allow for a modest rate of BMAR
reduction during and beyond the FYDP period in order to achieve the
minimum shop backlog of nondeferable work which is commensurate with
efficient production scheduling by FY 1988.
NIF - No special emphasis is required.
IC 14 Administrative Facilities ;
0&M,N - No special emphasis is required. Resource planning and execution
efforts should allow for BMAR containment (no growth) during the FYDP
period.
NIF - No special emphasis is required.
IC 15 Troop Housing and Messing Facilities ;
0&M,N - Major emphasis on maintenance and repair of troop housing and
messing facilities is essential. Efforts must be directed to the im-
provement of all deteriorated living quarters and messing facilities in
support of the Navy's major commitment to high quality of life issues.
Resource planning and execution efforts should allow for a major
reduction in BMAR during the FYDP period in order to achieve the minimum
shop backlog of nondeferable work which is commensurate with efficient
production scheduling by FY 1986.
NIF - No special emphasis is required.
IC 16 Other Personnel Support Facilities ;
0&M,N - The maintenance and repair of other Personnel Support Facilities
should receive special emphasis. Actions should be initiated which
improve the condition of morale, welfare, recreation, and religious
education facilities. Resource planning and execution efforts should
allow for a modest rate of BMAR reduction during and beyond the FYDP
period in order to achieve. the minimum shop backlog of nondeferable work
which is commensurate with efficient production scheduling by FY 1988.
NIF - Severe problems exist in all areas of utilities at all NIF
locations which have potential for serious mission impact. The problem
is so severe that the backlog total for NIF activities in this IC is the
highest of all ICs for all fund sources. Problems are due to age,
climatic deterioration, over usage, and past failure to accrue sufficient
resources. Many systems are so deteriorated that complete replacements
through the MCOM funding route are the only possible solution. Major
emphasis should be placed in this category to prevent serious mission
degradation throughout the NIF establishment.
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IC 17 Utilities ;
0&M,N - Major emphasis on maintenance and repair of utility systems is
essential. Major initiatives must be implemented which improve the
condition and efficiency of utility systems in direct support of fleet
units, maintenance-production facilities, and communication stations.
Resource planning and execution efforts should allow for a major
reduction in BMAR during the FTDP period in order to achieve the minimum
shop backlog of nondeferable work which is commensurate with efficient
production scheduling by FY 1986.
NIF - Severe problems exist in all areas of utilities at all NIF loca-
tions which have potential for serious mission impact. The problem is so
severe that the backlog total for NIF activities in this IC is the high-
est of all ICs for all fund sources. Problems are due to age, climatic
deterioration, over usage, and past failure to accrue sufficient
resources. Many systems are so deteriorated that complete replactments
through the MCON funding foute are the only possible solution. Major
emphasis should be placed in this category to prevent serious mission
degradation throughout the NIF establishment.
IC 18 Real Estate and Ground Structures ;
0&M,N - The maintenance and repair of Real Estate and Ground Structures -
should receive special emphasis. Particular attention should be directed
towards deteriorated roads and railroad tracks. Recource planning and
execution efforts should allow for a modest rate of BMAR reduction during
and beyond the FYDP period in order to achieve the minimum shop backlog
of nondeferable work which is codmensurate with efficient production
scheduling by FY 1988.
NIF - Increased emphasis is required to reduce the sharply growing
backlog in this IC. Of particular concern are railroad and crane
trackage which, in the present deteriorated state, adversely affects
mobilization readiness. Recent severe winters have caused accelerated
road deterioration which increases vehicle damage and repair costs.
Security fencing at ordnance stations also badly needs repair.







1. Description of activity. What particular problems does
this activity face which might be affecting its MRP
backlog?
2. History of backlog of the activity.
Questions
3. How accurate do you feel is your BMAR data?
If not confident of accuracy, why not?
4
.
Do you note any recent improvement in the BMAR?
If so, what are the causes?
5. What are your impressions of the new OP-44 program?
Will it mean more or less work for you?
Will it be worth the effort?
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